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I. The Problem
It is an old saying that one person's trash is another one's treasure.
Practical experience has shown, unfortunately, that one person's trash
can also be another's tragedy. While waste management has become a
goldmine for some, 1 it is worse than worthless for others. 2 Few com-
munities may welcome the money and jobs a treatment facility can foster.3
One entrepreneurial recycler found out just how rare such a welcome is
when his garbage barge travelled 6000 miles vainly seeking (in three coun-
tries and several states) to dispose of possibly hazardous municipal waste. 4
In the United States, 5 and in other industrialized nations, 6 the facilities
for treating and disposing of hazardous waste are reaching capacity and
few if any new ones are being built. Recently, public and private insti-
tutions have responded to this situation by focusing on domestic measures
*J.D.-M.B.A. Candidate, 1989, Southern Methodist University. Articles Editor, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAWYER.
I. See, e.g., Leonard, Cleaning up, FORBES, June I, 1987, at 52 (big market gains for
public waste management companies); Main & Fromson, Who Will Clean Up By Cleaning
Up, FORTUNE, March 17, 1986, at 96 (hazardous waste industry could be worth $300 billion
and last over fifty years).
2. See Marbach, What to Do with Our Waste, NEWSWEEK, July 27, 1987, at 51 (even
with advanced technologies and "exotic waste busters," no one wants a waste dump);
Schwab, Garbage in, Garbage out, PLANNING, Oct. 1986, at 4.
3. See, e.g., Waste Dump Wanted, TIME, July 20, 1987, at 70.
4. New York Begins Getting Rid of Trash No One Wanted, N.Y. Times. Sept. 2, 1987, at
BI, col. 4 (late ed.). The barge eventually returned to New York where authorities respon-
sible for incinerating the waste discovered that it was ordinary municipal garbage and
contained no hazardous waste.
5. See Crawford, Hazardous Waste: Where to Put It?, SCIENCE, Jan. 9, 1987, at 156.
6. See Rich, Waste Regulators Seek Global Accord, CHEMICAL WEEK, Sept. 3, 1986, at
20.
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to minimize the production of hazardous waste. 7 Unfortunately, mini-
mization is not the only response to increased regulation and public an-
tipathy: industrial producers or disposers of hazardous waste can escape
regulatory and physical constraints by shipping their wastes to other coun-
tries. 8 This comment discusses U.S. measures for control of the land-
based disposal of hazardous wastes outside the United States. The dis-
cussion does not include controls on radioactive wastes, which, although
hazardous and subject to extensive regulation, are not considered "haz-
ardous waste" within the context of government regulations. The dis-
cussion also excludes disposal at sea, whether controlled (e.g. ocean
incineration) or uncontrolled (e.g. shipping waste), although some of the
regulations discussed overlap into those areas.
II. The Solutions
There are at least two points at which to regulate international hazard-
ous waste disposal: at the foreign disposal sites and at the domestic de-
parture points. Regulation of disposal sites outside the United States
requires the extraterritorial application of U.S. law; export laws control
hazardous waste departure at the borders.
A. EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION
The United States passed its comprehensive National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 9 at a time when other industrialized countries
also established institutions and policies for environmental protection.' 0
Although NEPA, which required federal agencies to consider the envi-
ronmental impacts before deciding any major actions, contained possible
7. See, e.g., Biden, A New Direction for Environmental Policy: Hazardous Waste Pre-
vention, Not Disposal, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10400 (1987); Hunter, An International Forum
Looks at Waste Disposal, CHEMICAL WEEK, April I, 1987, at 23; Williams, A Study of
Hazardous Waste Minimization in Europe: Public and Private Strategies to Reduce Pro-
duction of Hazardous Waste, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 165 (1987); Note, Legal Incentives for
Reduction, Reuse, and Recycling: A New Approach to Hazardous Waste Management, 95
YALE L.J. 810 (1986).
8. Nonuniformity of treatment and disposal standards and lack of facilities is also blamed
for exports from and between countries of the European Community, Williams, supra note
7, at 222 n.248.
9. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a
(1982 & Supp. I1 1985)) [hereinafter NEPA].
10. Jacobson & Kay, A Framework for Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION/THE
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION 6 (H. Jacobson & D. Kay eds. 1983) (e.g. Japan passed en-
vironmental legislation in 1967 and Sweden in 1969; Sweden also established an environ-
mental protection board in 1967; the U.K. established a cabinet position in 1970).
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references to its international application,lI attempts to apply NEPA ex-
traterritorially met with mixed results.
In Sierra Club v. Coleman 12 the district court issued a preliminary
injunction to halt construction of a U.S.-funded highway in Panama and
Colombia because the environmental impacts had not been sufficiently
analyzed under NEPA. Without deciding whether NEPA was applicable,
the D.C. Court of Appeals found that the voluntary environmental anal-
ysis was adequate. 13 A district court in Pennsylvania found no jurisdiction
to halt a mining project in Australia on environmental grounds in Con-
servation Council v. Aluminum Co. of America. 14 That same year, the
D.C. Court of Appeals decided in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission' 5 that neither NEPA nor other nuclear
regulatory acts required consideration of the environmental impacts from
nuclear exports that might occur wholly within a foreign jurisdiction.16
The question was almost moot when decided, due to Executive Order
No. 12,114 (Order 12,114) 17 issued by President Carter in the previous
year. Order 12,114 resolved an executive branch controversy 18 over the
extent of NEPA's requirements without conceding or rejecting NEPA's
international reach and set forth the requirements for analysis of envi-
ronmental impacts abroad. For major federal actions significantly affecting
the environment of the global commons, 19 Order 12,114 requires a com-
plete "environmental impact statement." 20 If the proposed action involves
hazardous or radioactive waste or production facilities, or if it affects the
1I. Krauland, NEPA, Nukes and Non-Proliferation: Clarifying the Transnational Impact
Statement Mandate in Nuclear Export Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 201,
214 (1981); Comment, NEPA's Role in Protecting the World Environment, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 353 (1982).
12. 405 F. Supp. 53, 54 (D.D.C. 1975).
13. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
14. 518 F. Supp. 270 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
15. 647 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (D.C. Dir. 1981).
16. Cf. United States v. Catz Am. Co., 53 F.2d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 1931) (even if both the
importing and exporting country ban the use of a product, it could still be exported to that
country; the court presumed the importer would make the product comply with the law
before importing it).
17. Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions, 44 Fed. Reg. 1957 (1979),
reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982) [hereinafter Order 12,114].
18. The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) informed federal agencies that NEPA
did apply abroad and that CEQ had the regulatory responsibility, whereas the State De-
partment had determined that NEPA only applied to federal actions outside the jurisdiction
of any state, i.e. in the "global commons." Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extra-
territorial Application of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 265 (1980); Comment,
supra note II, at 364.
19. See supra note 18.
20. Order 12,114, supra note 17, §§ 2-3(a), -4(a)(i), (b)(i).
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environment beyond the borders of the nations participating in the action,
the agency undertaking the action determines whether to do a less-
extensive "multilateral environmental study" or "concise review of the
environmental issues." 21 For major federal actions significantly affecting
global resources specifically designated for protection by the President or
by international agreement, Order 12,114 requires one of the above-
mentioned environmental analyses, to be determined by the acting agency.22
Export permits, except for nuclear facilities, are specifically exempted
from Order 12,114.23
Although Order 12,114 and NEPA only apply to U.S. governmental
actions, federal agencies supervise many of the development projects
undertaken in areas of the world where domestic environmental regula-
tions are less likely to be enforced. 24 Recently the Reagan Administration
has been pressing the World Bank and the regional development banks
to include environmental safeguards in third world projects. 25
B. EXPORT CONTROLS ON HAZARDOUS WASTE
Export permits were specifically exempted from Order 12,114,26 but
shortly before leaving office, President Carter signed another Executive
Order (Order 12,264),27 which closed the gap. In the wake of controversy
over the export of dangerous products, 28 Order 12,264 established pro-
cedures for dealing with export requests for products restricted or banned
in the United States. Order 12,264 relied primarily on notification and
reporting requirements, although it also provided for limited export con-
trols. 29 Among the exports regulated by Order 12,264 were hazardous
substances 30 banned under the Federal Hazardous Substance Act 3' and
21. Id. §§ 2-3(b), (c), -4(a)(ii), (iii), -4(b)(ii),(iii).
22. Id. §§ 2-3(d), -4(a)(i),(ii), (iii), -4(b)(iv).
23. Id. § 2-5(a)(v).
24. Muldoon, The International Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Devel-
opment Assistance Agencies, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1 (1986).
25. Saving the Earth: U.S. Asks World Bank to Make Safeguarding the Environment a
Priority, Wall St. J., July 3, 1987, at I, col. 1. (Treasury Secretary James Baker has also
been pressing the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the Inter-
American Development Bank to take similar steps).
26. see supra text accompanying note 23.
27. Exec. Order 12,264, On Federal Policy Regarding the Export of Banned or Signifi-
cantly Restricted Substances, 46 Fed. Reg. 4,659 (1981).
28. See Note, Executive Authority: Revocation of Executive Order Requiring Notification
of Export of Hazardous Substances, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 683 (1981).
29. Exec. Order 12,264, supra note 27, § 1-301.
30. Id. § 1-101(1).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982) [hereinafter FHSA].
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chemical mixtures32 subject to the Toxic Substances Control Act. 33 Within
a month, a newly elected President Reagan revoked Order 12,264.
34
Notification requirements similar to those under Order 12,264 already
existed for hazardous waste exports under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA). 35 RCRA itself did not expressly ad-
dress the export of hazardous waste but the standards applicable to gen-
erators and transporters of hazardous waste formed the basis 36 for limited
export regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) in 1980. 37
The 1980 export regulations were minimal: they required that the ex-
porter notify the EPA each year before the initial shipment of hazardous
waste to each foreign country by identifying the waste and the consignee
who would receive the waste; 38 they required transporters of hazardous
waste to note the date the waste left the United States on their own copy
of the manifest and on the copy returned to the waste generator;39 and
they required that the generator get confirmation of the delivery of the
waste from the consignee. 40 Although the same general requirements of
recordkeeping and handling applied equally to domestic hazardous wastes
and hazardous wastes for export while in the United States, the export
regulations did not require reporting of the quantity of waste, the fre-
quency of shipment, or the manner of transportation or treatment outside
the United States. 4' The regulations also gave EPA no authority to prohibit
any export refused by a foreign country. 42 Similarly, the State Department
communicated concerns about health and environmental risks to govern-
ments to whom toxic waste offers had been made, and advised them to
obtain full information (from potential exporters as well as from U.S.
government agencies) and to evaluate the risks before making a decision. 43
32. Exec. Order 12,264, supra note 27, § 1-101(n).
33. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604-2606 (1982) [hereinafter TSCA].
34. Exec. Order 12,290, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,943 (1981).
35. Pub. L. No. 94-580, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp.
11I 1985).
36. Hazardous Waste Management System: Exports of Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg.
28,664 (1986) (final rule) [hereinafter Hazardous Waste].
37. 45 Fed. Reg 12,732, 12743-44 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262-63 (1986)).
38. Standards Applicable to Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. pt. 262 subpt. E
(1986) [hereinafter Standards]; see also Hazardous Waste Management System: Exports of
Hazardous Waste, 51 Fed. Reg. 8744 (1986) (proposed rule) [hereinafter Hazardous Waste
(proposed)].
39. Standards Applicable to Transporters of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. pt. 263 (1986);
see also Hazardous Waste (proposed), supra note 38.
40. Standards, supra note 38; see also Hazardous Waste (proposed), supra note 38.
41. Standards, supra note 38; see also Hazardous Waste (proposed), supra note 38.
42. Standards, supra note 38; see also Hazardous Waste (proposed), supra note 38.
43. Note, Any Place but Here: A Critique of United States Hazardous Export Policy, 7
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 329, 343 & n.92 (1981) (citing Export of Hazardous Products: Hear-
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EPA acquired the authority to control hazardous waste exports and
coordinate notification with the State Department after congressional con-
cern over possible loopholes in the control of U.S. hazardous wastes and
the potential for foreign policy and environmental problems44 led to the
passage of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA). 45
HSWA prohibits any export of hazardous waste unless: (1) the exporter
has notified the EPA; (2) the government of the receiving country has
consented to receive the waste; (3) a copy of the written consent accom-
panies the waste shipment; and (4) the shipment conforms to the terms
of consent. 46 An international agreement between the United States and
the government of the receiving country may provide specific alternative
requirements. 47 In addition, exporters of hazardous waste must file an
annual report with EPA summarizing the types, quantities, frequency, and
destination of all hazardous waste exported that year.48 HSWA provides
criminal penalties for the knowing export of hazardous waste in violation
of its requirements. 49
In August 1986 EPA published the final rulemaking on the HSWA
exports50 with minimal legislative history for guidance. 51 Two decisions 52
ings before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)).
44. Hazardous Waste (proposed), supra note 38, at 8745 (citing S. REP. No. 98-284, 98th
Cong., Ist Sess. 47 (1983); 129 CONG. REC. H8163-64 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1983).
45. Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.) [hereinafter HSWA]. Id. § 3017, 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 11 1984) specifies export
controls.
46. Id. § 3017(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
47. Id. § 3017(f), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(f) (Supp. 11 1984). At the time no such international
agreements existed. 51 Fed. Reg. 28,664, 28,665 (1986). Since that time, the United States
has signed an agreement with Mexico, Agreement on the Transboundary Shipments of
Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, United States-Mexico, Nov. 12, 1986, 26
1.L.M. 25 (1987) [hereinafter Mexican Agreement], and with Canada, Agreement Concerning
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, United States-Canada, Oct. 28, 1986, ref-
erenced in 26 I.L.M. 593 (1987) (notification reproduced from 86 DEP'T ST. BULL. 90-92
(January, 1987)) (copy on file at THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER) [hereinafter Canadian
Agreement].
48. HSWA, supra note 45, § 3017(g), 42 U.S.C. § 6938(g) (Supp. 11 1984).
49. Id. § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d), (e) (Supp. 11 1984).
50. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36.
51. Legislative history is primarily limited to text of amendment and general supporting
statements on how export controls will avoid past problems. 129 CONG. REC. H8163 (daily
ed. Oct. 6, 1983); 130 CONG. REC. S9152 (daily ed. July 25, 1984); S. REP. No. 284, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1983); 1984 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS 5576, 5686.
52. Decisions of the OECD, unlike recommendations, are binding on all members unless
otherwise provided. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, Dec. 14, 1960, arts. 5a, b, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1734, T.I.A.S. No. 4891,888 U.N.T.S.
179, 185. A decision is not applicable to a member who abstains from approval, id. art.
6(2), and even after approval, no decision is binding on a member until it has complied with
its own constitutional procedures, id. art. 6(3). See also 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1102 (1970).
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on the transboundary movement of hazardous waste53 by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),54 of which the
United States is a member, provided additional reference. The EPA reg-
ulations, effective November 8, 1986, define the scope of application to
certain wastes as well as to certain actors, discuss the notification and
consent procedures, and determine the time period and degree of flexi-
bility of notification and consent.
EPA definition of hazardous waste includes all solid wastes specifically
listed as such55 as well as those that exhibit certain harmful characteristics
(e.g. ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity). 56 EPA specifically
exempts some small amounts of hazardous waste materials from
regulation 57 and minimally regulates others. 58 HSWA export controls,
with one narrow exception, 59 apply only to the extent that the hazardous
waste is regulated by EPA. 60
Those entities that initiate the shipment of hazardous waste, 6 1 as well
as transporters62 and intermediaries that arrange for export, 63 are subject
to differing responsibilities and liabilities under the HSWA export regu-
53. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,667 (citing Draft Council Decision and Rec-
ommendation of Exports of Hazardous Waste from OECD Area, March 1986; cf. final OECD
Council Decision-Recommendation on Exports of Hazardous Wastes, June 5, 1986, 25
I.L.M. 1010 (1986) [hereinafter OECD Export Decision]); Hazardous Waste, supra note 36,
at 28,671 (citing Decision and Recommendation of the Council on Transfrontier Movement
of Hazardous Waste, Feb. 1, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 214 (1984) [hereinafter OECD Transfrontier
Decision]).
54. Originating as the group of countries cooperating in the Marshall Plan reconstruction
of Europe after World War 11, OECD now includes as members Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy. Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States as members. L.
CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 85 (1984); Arup, Chemical Notifi-
cation Laws in the OECD Member Countries, 21 J. WORLD TRADE L. 47, 49 n.6 (1987).
55. 40 C.F.R. pts. 261.3, .11, .30-.33 (1987).
56. Id. pts. 261.3, .10, .20-.24.
57. Id. pts. 261.6, .7 (residues); see also Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,669 (citing
50 Fed. Reg. 614,619 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261.2)) (commercial chemical products
recycled in a particular manner).
58. 40 C.F.R. pts. 261.4(d), .5 (1987) (samples for testing, small quantity generators).
59. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,671 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 261.6(a)(3)(i)
(1987)) (spent industrial ethyl alcohol is exempt from EPA domestic regulation, because that
is handled by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms with notice and tracking re-
quirements similar to EPA's manifest requirements, but will be subject to HSWA export
requirements administered by EPA when the spent alcohol is exported for reclamation).
60. Id. at 28,670, 28,682-83 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.50, .51 (1987)) (export controls
only apply to those wastes that require an EPA manifest domestically).
61. Id. at 28,667-69, 28,682-83 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.50, 262.51 (1987)).
62. Id. at 28,667-68, 28,677, 28,685 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 263.20 (1987)).
63. Id. at 28,667-69, 28,682-83 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.50, 262.51 (1987)).
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lations. "Primary exporters," 64 which initiate the foreign shipments of
hazardous waste, jointly bear65 the greatest responsibility and liability.
They are directly responsible for timely, complete and accurate
notification66 to EPA about the proposed export of hazardous waste, and
for compliance with the written consent 67 of any "receiving country(ies)"
to which the waste is sent for disposal, treatment (including recycling),
or storage (except for temporary storage incidental to transportation). 68
Although the primary exporter must name, and the EPA will notify, any
"transit country(ies)" through which the hazardous waste will travel,
consent of transit countries is not required prior to export. 69 The primary
exporter must also make specific efforts to verify that the waste went
where it was intended. 70
Transporters that only arrange for transportation 7' must ensure that an
EPA manifest and consent accompany the waste; must deliver a copy of
the manifest to the U.S. Customs when the waste leaves the country; and
must refuse to export the hazardous waste if they know72 that it does not
conform to the consent. 73 Primary exporters, including their employees, 74
are subject to criminal penalties for knowing violation of the export reg-
ulations (e.g. exporting without the consent of the receiving country). 75
Consent of the receiving country and notification of transit countries
is achieved through EPA acting in concert with the Department of State: 76
EPA forwards a completed notification to the Department of State for
64. Primary exporter refers only to those who initially decide to export the hazardous
waste or brokers who arrange for the foreign management of hazardous waste, not to those
who only provide transportation between facilities. Id. at 28,667, 28,683 (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 262.51 (1987)).
65. Brokers that arrange for waste management are jointly liable with those that decide
to export the waste. Id.
66. Id. at 28,667-68, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.53(a), 262.54 (1987)).
67. Id. at 28,667-68, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.52(d), 262.53(d),(f) (1987)).
68. Id. at 28,666-69, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.51 (1987)).
69. Id. at 28,667, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.52(b), 262.52(a)(2)(iv),(viii),
262.53(e),(f) (1987)).
70. See id. at 28,684 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.54(f), 262.55 (1987)).
71. Transporters that are also export brokers are primary exporters. See supra note 64.
72. Liability for knowing nonconformance does not include an affirmative duty to ensure
conformance of the shipment with the consent, but the transporter may not escape liability
by being "willfully blind" to the nonconformance. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at
28,668; Lf. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (1lth Cir. 1986) (cited in
Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,670).
73. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,677, 28,685 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 263.20
(1987)).
74. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 667 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 1169 U.S. 1208 (1985) (cited in Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,669).
75. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,668-69, see also id. at 28,684 (codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 262.56(a)(6)).
76. Id. at 28,675, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 262.53(b),(d),(e),(f) 1987)).
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transmission to the U.S. Embassy in the receiving or transit countries;
after any necessary translation, the U.S. Embassy forwards the infor-
mation to the appropriate authorities; the U.S. Embassy translates and
then cables the terms of consent (or other response) to the Department
of State for transmission to EPA and thence to the exporter. 77 A copy of
the cable containing the terms of consent accompanies the hazardous
waste shipment attached to the manifest. 78 The consent of the receiving
country is an absolute prerequisite (regardless of how long it takes), so
EPA's requested sixty-day notification in advance of export is only an
estimate of EPA's expected response time.
79
The exporter's notification to EPA covers the intended shipments of a
particular hazardous waste for the next twelve months, including infor-
mation about where the waste is going, how often and how much, and
what will happen when the waste reaches its intended destination.80 Any
changes in the original notification, except for changes in the exporter's
telephone number, the mode of transportation, the type of container, and
decreases in quantity of waste, 81 mandate renotification and renewed
consent from the receiving country. Renotification, but no new consent
is required for changes that are to take place in transit countries. 82
HSWA export controls focus only on hazardous waste as defined by
EPA-i.e. discarded 83 industrial byproducts with certain characteris-
tics. 84 To export substances that are hazardous but that may not meet
EPA's definition of waste (e.g. certain recyclable materials), the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act (also
administered by EPA) require that exporters file an informational report
with the EPA, which is passed on to the foreign country. 85 Under the
Toxic Substances Control Act, EPA has the authority to restrict the man-
ufacture and trade of such substances, an authority it has used to ban the
export of certain concentrations of the highly toxic PCBs. 86 The Export
77. Id.
78. Id. at 28,675, 28,684 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 262.54(h) (1987)).
79. Id. at 28,672-73, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 262.53(a) (1987)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 28,674-75, 28,683 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 262.53(c) (1987)).
82. Id.
83. The issue of whether a substance is in fact "discarded" and therefore waste has been
one of the most difficult questions under RCRA. Gaba, Recovering Hazardous Waste Cleanup
Costs: The Private Cause ofAction Under CERCLA, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 181, 186 n. 12 (1986).
84. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
85. FHSA, supra note 31, § 1273(d); TSCA, supra note 33, § 2611. It is unlikely that the
FHSA would apply very often since it primarily controls the export of products intended
for household use or use by a child. FHSA, supra note 31, §§ 1261, 1273(d).
86. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,665 (citing Toxic Substances Control Act
§ 6(e), 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 761.10) (ban on export of PCBs
greater than 50 ppm)).
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Administration Amendments Act of 1985 contains congressional findings
and declarations that such export controls on banned or restricted sub-
stances are consistent with U.S. policy,87 but provides no additional mea-
sures for controlling the exports of such substances.
C. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
The United States is party to a number of international agreements that
cover environmental protection in general or hazardous waste in partic-
ular. Much of the original "soft law," or nonbinding principles, has served
as the basis for the hard law of international conventions and agreements.
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) was established
to deal with worldwide environmental problems following the recom-
mendation of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
at Stockholm in 1972.88 UNEP started with development of an interna-
tional environmental information gathering infrastructure and progressed
to the development of guidelines for dealing with particular problems as
they were illuminated. 89 The International Register of Potentially Toxic
Chemicals (IRPTC) and the International Programme on Chemical Safety
are UNEP sources of information on hazardous substances. 90 In 1984
UNEP adopted a "Provisional Notification Scheme for Banned and Se-
verely Restricted Chemicals," 91 suggesting notification of the importing
country. In 1985 UNEP issued the draft Cairo Guidelines and Principles
for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, 92 which
includes import consent as well as export notification requirements. The
U.N. Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations contains
provisions for disclosure of information on hazardous effects and regu-
latory measures from the source country and for protection of the envi-
ronment with suitable technology. 93 The U.N. Draft Code on the Transfer
of Technology 94 recommends that developed countries facilitate access
of developing countries to technology that will help solve indigenous
87. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401(10), 2402(13) (Supp. 111 1985).
88. L. CALDWELL, supra note 54, at 63.
89. Id., at 64-68.
90. Id. at 219.
91. Halter, Regulating Information Exchange and International Trade in Pesticides and
Other Toxic Substances to Meet the Needs of Developing Countries, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1,16 (1987) (citing U.N. Doc. No. EP/WG.112/2, Annex 1 (Nov. 23, 1984)).
92. U.N. Environment Programme at 12, 13, U.N. Doc. No. EP/WG. 122/L. I/Add.3/Rev. 1
(1985) (cited in Halter, supra note 91, at 17 n.75).
93. Rhodes, Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: International Codes of Conduct, in
IA THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 16.06[5], app. 16E (V. Nanda
ed. 1986); Comment, Hazardous Exports to the Third World: The Need to Abolish the Double
Standard, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 71, 80 (1987).
94. Rhodes, supra note 93, § 16.06[3], app. 16E; Comment, supra note 93, at 80.
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problems. It also recommends assistance in establishing laws to avoid the
environmental risks that accompany technology.
OECD has also developed a code of conduct for multinational
enterprises 95 (MNE Guidelines) 96 as well as a specific framework for
handling hazardous wastes exports (OECD Transfrontier Decision97 and
OECD Export Decision98 (OECD Decisions)). Although most of the MNE
Guidelines and the administrative measures of the OECD Decisions are
couched as recommendations, the OECD Decisions also mandate general
procedures for member countries. 99 The single requirement of the 1984
OECD Transfrontier Decision that member countries "shall ensure that
the competent authorities of the countries concerned are provided with
adequate and timely information" 100 has expanded to a quadripartite de-
cision. The 1986 OECD Export Decision now requires that member
countries:
(i)... ensure that their ... authorities are empowered to prohibit [hazardous
waste] exports in appropriate instances;
(ii) [a]pply no less strict controls on ... non-Member countries than they would
on ... Member countries;
(iii) [p]rohibit movements of hazardous wastes to a ... non-Member country
without the consent of that country and the prior notification to any transit
countries... ;
(iv) [p]rohibit movements of hazardous wastes to a non-Member country unless
the wastes are directed to an adequate disposal facility in that country.101
OECD's definition of hazardous waste includes wastes "considered...
or legally defined as hazardous in the country ... through or to which it
is conveyed."' 1 2 The recommended administrative measures for imple-
menting the OECD Export Decision may apply in the absence of an
international agreement between exporting and importing countries, or
serve as the basis for negotiating such an agreement. 03
95. The most common term in the United States is multinational corporation; the United
Nations calls them transnational corporations. Regardless of its name, each refers to a set
of common characteristics: commercial entities that do business in two or more countries,
that formulate common strategies or policies through one or more headquarters, and that
significantly influence the activities of each other through various linkages. Rhodes, supra
note 93, §§ 16.01 n.2, 16.02.
96. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 15 I.L.M. 969 ( 1976); Rhodes, supra
note 93, § 16.06[4], app. 16E; see also Clarification of Environmental Concerns in OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 25 I.L.M. 494 (1986).
97. OECD Transfrontier Decision, supra note 53; see also Comment, supra note 93, at
81.
98. OECD Export Decision, supra note 53; see also Comment, supra note 93, at 81.
99. See supra notes 52-54.
100. OECD Transfrontier Decision, supra note 53, § I, at 215.
100. OECD Transfrontier Decision, supra note 53, § I, at 215.
101. OECD Export Decision, supra note 53, § 1, at 101l.
102. Id. at 1013; OECD Transfrontier Decision, supra note 53, § 1, at 217.
103. OECD Export Decision, supra note 53, § I, at 1011.
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It is unclear to what extent, if any, the final OECD Export Decision
served as the basis for negotiations in the U.S. bilateral agreements with
Mexico and with Canada, which were signed a few months later.10 4 The
agreement with Mexico (not a member of OECD) clearly requires noti-
fication of the importing country as both HSWA export controls and the
OECD Export Decision mandate. 10 5 The requirement for consent of the
importing country is less clear: the agreement does not explain what
happens if the importing country fails to respond to notification within
the forty-five days allotted. 106 By contrast, the agreement with Canada
(an OECD member country) specifically states that no response within
the thirty-day notification period shall be deemed to mean no objection
and the export may take place.10 7
Both the Canadian and the Mexican bilateral agreements provide for
the readmission of hazardous wastes that are returned by the country of
import, 10 8 but the agreement with Mexico also provides for the readmis-
sion of hazardous waste generated from temporarily admitted raw ma-
terials, and of illegally imported hazardous substances. 109 The agreement
with Mexico also requires notification for export of hazardous sub-
stances, 110 which differs from the notification requirements for hazardous
waste, and the agreement alludes to the goal of "bring[ing] uniformity in
those relating to both hazardous waste and hazardous substances regard-
ing compulsory notification to and consent by the importing country."' 1 '
The standard for requiring notification is set by the country of export in
the case of hazardous waste,t 1 2 but it is unclear which country's standard
applies for hazardous substances. Hazardous substances are defined by
"national policies, laws or regulations," 113 and each side notifies the other
when such a determination is made. 14 Which determination of hazardous
substances triggers the requirement for notification of the export of "a
hazardous substance"? "15
104. See supra note 47.
105. Compare Mexican Agreement, supra note 47, art. 111, with HSWA, supra note 45;
40 C.F.R. pts. 262.53(a), .54 (1987); and OECD Export Decision, supra note 53, § 1, at
1011.
106. Mexican Agreement, supra note 47, art. I11 (I), (2), (4).
107. Canadian Agreement, supra note 47, art. 3 (c), (d).
108. Mexican Agreement, supra note 47, art. IV; Canadian Agreement, supra note 47,
art. 6.
109. Mexican Agreement, supra note 47, arts. IX, X1.
110. Id. art. VI.
Ill. Id. art. X.
112. Id. art. Ill (1).
113. Id. art. 1(3).
114. Id. art. V (1).
115. Id. art. VI (I).
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The same ambiguity is present in the agreement with Canada. The
agreement simply says that the exporting country will notify the importing
country of proposed shipments of hazardous waste, 1 6 which has different
meanings with respect to the two countries. 117 The agreement with Canada
refers to the OECD Transfrontier Decision which, like the OECD Export
Decision, does not resolve the ambiguity: hazardous waste is that waste
defined as such in the exporting, importing or transit country."18
D. MINIMIZATION
Although the recent movement towards waste minimization1 19 is not
really a means of controlling the disposition of hazardous waste, ultimately
any minimization efforts will have an impact on hazardous waste disposal.
HSWA export regulations, like other U.S. environmental protection reg-
ulations, require some reporting of minimization efforts undertaken and
results achieved. ' 2 0 No international agreements deal specifically with the
minimization of solid hazardous wastes, but recent multilateral agree-
ments12' to reduce the use of aerosol chemicals that are destroying the
earth's protective ozone layer are a form of international "hazardous"
waste minimization.
III. Alternative Solutions
Hazardous substances are not like other products. As the tragedy in
Bhopal has shown, the avoidance of liability (which may take years to
resolve in any event) is not sufficient incentive even to begin to assure
adequate safeguards. 2 2 Some kind of regulation is needed, whether by
the exporting or importing countries, or some combination thereof.
116. Canadian Agreement, supra note 47, art. 3(a).
117. Hazardous waste "means with respect to Canada, waste dangerous goods," which
may be more or less inclusive than the meaning "with respect to the United States, waste
which requires an EPA manifest." Canadian Agreement, supra note 47, art. 1(b).
118. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
120. Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,684 (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 262. 56(a)(5)(i),
(ii) (1987)).
121. Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons, done Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (1987); Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, done March 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516
(1987); see also Accord Is Reached to Protect Ozone, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1987, at A 1l,
col. I (late ed.); Dozens of Nations Reach Agreement to Protect Ozone, N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1987, at Al, col. 3 (late ed.) twenty-four nations plus the EC signed the protocol; an
additional twenty, without the authority to sign, approved the agreement).
122. See generally The Bhopal Tragedy: Social and Legal Issues: A Symposium, 20 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 267 (1985).
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If the United States were to impose a total ban on the export of haz-
ardous waste, as the Federal Republic of Germany is preparing to do, 123
the burden for regulating hazardous waste would remain in the United
States where the present network of laws and regulations would promote
a high level of environmental protection. Yet a total ban would restrict
the opportunities for developing countries, which might otherwise benefit
from the associated jobs, money, commercial activity, technological ed-
ucation, or source of recycled chemicals. 124
If the United States were to allow unrestricted export of hazardous
waste, it would shift the entire burden of regulation to governments that
may not even be aware that the wastes are in their country, much less be
prepared to cope with the potential problems. Hazardous waste contam-
ination can exhaust the most well-organized bureaucracy with sophisti-
cated clean-up technology. What disaster would result in a country with
limited environmental protection infrastructure and nonexistent clean-up
technology?
There are more selfish reasons for concern as well. Unlike the dangerous
consumer products and pesticides that first led to the imposition of export
controls, hazardous wastes improperly or incompletely disposed of may
contaminate not only the disposal site of the host country, but can spread
through the air or water to other countries. 125 The damage may not be-
come apparent until long after the disposal is completed, when cleanup
is much more difficult.1 26 Such insidious pollution of the global environ-
ment makes the disposal of hazardous waste a "commons" problem 127-
not because the problem is outside the jurisdiction of any one state, but
because the solution is beyond the ability of any one state acting
unilaterally. 128
The bilateral agreements with Mexico and with Canada 129 are too recent
for us to judge if they are adequate to control illegal transboundary dis-
posal (apparently their primary purpose). It will be interesting to see if
the administrative efficiency of Canada's presumed consent 30 is accom-
123. See Hunter, supra note 7.
124. Cf. supra note 3 and accompanying text.
125. See Teclaff & Teclaff, International Control of Cross-Media Pollution-An Ecosys-
tem Approach, 27 NAT. RES. J. 21 (1987).
126. Cleanup of a contaminated dumpsite solves one hazardous waste problem, but gen-
erates another: disposal of the contaminated soil. See Cook, Risky Business, FORBES, Dec.
2, 1985, at 106.
127. See supra note 18.
128. See Bilder, The Role of Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Envi-
ronmental Injury, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51 (1981).
129. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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panied by administrative effectiveness. The high level of environmental
supervision in Canada may justify a presumption of consent where a
bilateral agreement has arranged for specific alternative procedures.
Nevertheless, notification and consent should remain the rule, not the
exception. A 1985 study of EPA notification programs found that "de-
veloping countries have trouble obtaining adequate information for de-
cision making; information still does not reach the appropriate people in
most instances, and obtaining additional information can be cumber-
some."131
Both bilateral agreements, as well as HSWA export controls fail to
address the issue of receiving-facility standards. The OECD Export
Decision' 32 requires its members to prohibit the export of hazardous
wastes to a nonmember-country unless they are directed to an "adequate
disposal facility."' 133 Varying levels of environmental supervision within
foreign countries do not justify this differentiation between member and
nonmember countries; both should provide assurances that the receiving
facilities are adequate. The adequacy of the disposal facility should be no
less than the exporting country's standards, including operations, man-
agement, and the appropriate worker protections. 134 The United States
should answer Mexico's 135 and others136 appeal for uniformity and should
require notification, consent, and verification of adequate handling for the
export of all hazardous substances, at least where the quantity and quality
of the hazard is sufficient to cause widespread problems. The verification
procedure could be as simple as having the importing country certify its
facilities and attach the certification to the manifest, or it might require
more active inspections. Environmental evaluations in foreign countries
already take place for projects with less devastating potential, 137 but they
need not be accomplished by government officials. Such environmental
protection requirements are consistent with the general conduct guidelines
for transnational businesses, 138 although the exporters of hazardous waste
are not necessarily multinationals.
Using the strict standards of the exporting countries will serve a twofold
purpose: (I) the export laws will support the domestic environmental
131. Halter, supra note 91, at 26.
132. OECD Export Decision, supra note 53.
133. Id., § l(iv), at 1011.
134. For a discussion of occupational health problems in developing nations, see Brennan
& Lucas, A Legal Strategy for Controlling the Export of Hazardous Industries to Developing
Countries: The Case of Asbestos, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORDER 275 (1983).
135. See supra note I ll and accompanying text.
136. See Halter, supra note 91, at 25 (foreign officials "were confused about the distinc-
tions among the ... notification programs, and suggested harmonizing the programs").
137. See Order 12,114, supra note 17.
138. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
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regulations and provide "equally firm"' 139 environmental protection in-
ternationally, and (2) by assuring that the true costs of safe disposal are
recognized and paid in advance, there will be no need later to decide who
is liable for the clean-up costs. Adherence to the OECD Export Decision
requirement for adequate disposal facilities will provide minimal com-
petitive disadvantage to U.S.businesses since most of their major com-
petitors come from OECD countries that are equally bound by such
requirements. 140 In addition, recognition of all the costs of hazardous
waste disposal will provide additional impetus to hazardous waste min-
imization efforts, domestically and internationally. Minimization of haz-
ardous waste cannot be accomplished unilaterally or even bilaterally. The
multilateral effort to protect the Earth's ozone layer' 4 ' has shown, how-
ever, that it can be accomplished, that developing and developed nations
can find a workable compromise.
IV. Conclusion
The United States should prohibit the export of hazardous substances
unless satisfied that the importing country has the information and tech-
nology to handle them. Even if the primary export incentive of evading
expensive regulatory procedures is no longer available, the export of
hazardous waste will continue. Some commentators suggest that it is
almost impossible, regardless of the safeguards, to find a community in
the U.S. that will accept hazardous waste. 142 Remote areas in other lands,
with adequate controls, may still be more profitable because of the reduced
political costs.
Another compelling reason to provide environmental protection for waste
leaving the country is to ensure that the responsibility for hazardous waste
is borne by the generators of hazardous waste and the consumers of their
products. This country long ago decided that it would not accept the sale
of human lives offered at auction; nor should it allow the savings from in-
adequate environmental safeguards to buy human futures. Marketplace in-
centives for waste minimization, resulting from the increased costs of
disposal and handling, will be more powerful than regulatory measures by
themselves. Finding ways to eliminate rather than just dispose of hazard-
ous waste will mean less trash and more to treasure for us all.
139. See Hazardous Waste, supra note 36, at 28,670 (quoting Statement of Rep. Mikulski,
sponsor of HSWA § 3017 export controls, 129 CoNG. REC. H8163 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1983)).
140. Of the "developed countries," only Australia, which abstained in the decision, is
exempt. See supra notes 52-54.
141. See supra note 121.
142. See, e.g., Marbach, supra note 2.
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